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Abstract
The adjustment to the financial crisis was particularly brutal for Eurozone countries targeted by 
private bondholders. Financial assistance through the newly created Eurozone governance system 
was conditional on the implementation of austerity measures and the introduction of structural 
reforms in industrial relations (decentralization of collective bargaining and liberalization of 
employment protection). Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural 
features of Eurozone supranational institutions. Building from the insights of actor-centred 
institutionalism, we illustrate the importance of coalitions among some, but not all, important 
actors based on the overlapping of their non-monolithic preferences in the process of institutional 
innovation. The structural features of Eurozone institutions curtailed member states’ ability to 
effectively resist the imposition of internal devaluation policies. A contested outcome, these 
institutional features were secured by a specific coalition of important actors – most notably, 
the German government and the European Central Bank – based on their overlapping interests 
around internal devaluation policies.
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Introduction
The adjustment process to the financial crisis was particularly brutal for Eurozone coun-
tries targeted by private bondholders. Newly created supranational institutions of finan-
cial assistance, the temporary EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility, established in 
May 2010) and the permanent ESM (European Stability Mechanism, agreed to in March 
2011 and made operational in September 2012) provided financial assistance only on 
stringent terms (Blyth, 2013; Hall, 2014). The formal bailout packages provided to 
Greece (May 2010, March 2012 and July 2015), Ireland (December 2010) and Portugal 
(May 2011) required them to implement extensive austerity measures and introduce lib-
eralizing reforms of their industrial relations systems, that is, internal devaluation strate-
gies designed at improving international (price) competitiveness by reducing labour 
costs (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Rathgeb and Tassinari, 2020). Reforms in the 
sphere of industrial relations took the form of the decentralization of collective bargain-
ing and the liberalization of collective redundancy schemes (Marginson, 2015).
Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural features of suprana-
tional institutions of Eurozone financial assistance (EFSF/ESM) that have been promi-
nent in the imposition of structural reforms in the area of industrial relations on countries 
(and their workers) targeted by private bondholders. Our argument builds upon the 
insights of the actor-centred institutionalism perspective that emphasize the interdepend-
ent character of the relationship between actors and institutions in contemporary capital-
ism (Scharpf, 1997, 2000). First, institutional arrangements constitute configurations of 
power that influence the direction and character of change by structuring, in an asym-
metrical manner, power relations among actors (Scharpf, 1997: 36–50). Institutions are 
not neutral as they condition access to, and thus influence over, the decision-making 
process (Hall, 1986). In our analysis, the ability of actors to resist the imposition of inter-
nal devaluation policies was constrained by key institutional features of the newly cre-
ated supranational organizations. These are the provision of veto power over lending 
decisions to large member states with domestic banks exposed to the rest of the Eurozone, 
and the inclusion of two actors (European Central Bank (ECB) and IMF) with marked 
preferences for stringent conditionality as members of the Troika (Henning, 2017; 
Mueller, 2015). However, theoretical perspectives based on institutional arrangements as 
configurations of power remain incomplete. If institutions are so important, actors will 
seek to influence their structural features (Roe, 1998). How do new institutions emerge?
Second, actor-centred institutionalism emphasizes the relational character of how 
important actors interact strategically with each other (Scharpf, 1997: 36–58; see also 
Hall, 1984). Traditional analyses of the formation of international institutions highlight 
the prominence of important national governments to achieve collaboratively what they 
cannot on their own (Keohane, 1984; see also Goyer and Valdivielso del Real, 2018, for 
an overview). The resulting institutional outcomes are often based on convergence 
around lowest common denominator solutions. Moving beyond broad, and static, per-
spectives that highlight how institutional innovations reflect the importance of powerful 
actors, however, our analysis underlines the theoretical contribution of two key concepts 
in actor-centred institutionalism (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Scharpf, 1997: 72–84). 
The first illustrates that the interests of actors are non-monolithic, thereby enabling them 
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to prioritize in a selective manner specific dimensions of their preferences at the expense 
of others. The second concept highlights that institutional innovation reflects strategic 
interaction among actors in a coalitional manner based on overlapping interests. 
Incorporating these two concepts, our analysis illustrates how the preferences of some, 
but not all, important actors were translated into institutional outputs. The core institu-
tional features of the newly created Eurozone supranational institutions emerged as a con-
tested outcome secured by a coalition of actors with overlapping interests around the 
implementation of internal devaluation strategies. The strategic activism of the German 
government and the ECB – the former supported by smaller countries (Austria, Finland 
and the Netherlands) – involved both the provision of financial resources and the selective 
use of veto power in the process of institutional construction (Schild, 2020; Woodruff, 
2016). The latter demonstrates how the imposition of internal devaluation strategies, and 
more specifically the liberalization of industrial relations arrangements, did not occur in 
an automatic fashion. The preferences of the French government, an important Eurozone 
actor, for solutions based on the provision of massive liquidity to quash speculations on 
bond markets, not on the implementation of internal devaluation measures, were rejected. 
Resisting alternatives illustrates the multiplicity of preferences of actors engaged in coali-
tion formation over institutional building (Scharpf, 1997: 51–68; see also Hyman, 2015).
The article is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of the importance of 
internal devaluation in the adjustment process to the financial crisis. Second, we discuss the 
insights and limitations of interest-based perspectives that assign primary influence to 
important political actors, namely, the members of the Troika and large member states with 
domestic banks exposed to the rest of the Eurozone. Third, we present the key features of 
our theoretical framework that highlights how institutional innovations result from the 
interactions among important actors in a coalitional manner based on overlapping interests. 
Finally, we provide an empirical overview of the institutional construction of supranational 
arrangements of financial assistance that have been prominent in the use of the internal 
devaluation strategy as the main mechanism of management of the Eurozone crisis.
Internal devaluation and the management of the Eurozone 
crisis
This article examines an important aspect of innovation in European governance, namely, 
the development and design of institutional mechanisms of financial assistance (EFSF/
ESM). Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural features of 
Eurozone supranational institutions. This targeted focus reflects the importance of these 
Eurozone institutions in the imposition of structural reforms in the area of industrial rela-
tions for recipient member states. Two features characterize the stringent conditionality 
of bailout packages in the Eurozone: the imposition of austerity measures, and the intro-
duction of important legal changes in the sphere of industrial relations in the form of the 
decentralization of collective bargaining and the liberalization of collective redundancy 
schemes. The selection of these two forms of conditionality reflected the prevalence of 
the concept of internal devaluation (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Rathgeb and 
Tassinari, 2020).
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In the management of the Eurozone crisis, national systems of industrial relations of 
member states have been particularly susceptible to demands for the implementation of 
internal devaluation measures following reduced adjustment options and the policy posi-
tions of important European actors. First, external devaluation (currency devaluation and 
increases in monetary supply) as a strategy of adjustment to problems of balance of pay-
ments imbalances and/or government deficits is not available (De Grauwe, 2013). 
Eurozone governments cannot monetize their budget deficits due to their lack of control 
over the money supply and their inability to devalue periodically against their trading 
partners (Blyth, 2013). Yet, the removal of the strategy of external devaluation does not 
mean that there was only one course of action available to policy-makers (Armingeon 
and Baccaro, 2012). Second, important European actors have been opposed to the intro-
duction of reflation policies, alongside adjustment in debtor countries, whereby surplus 
countries implement strongly expansionary wage policy in order to reduce trade imbal-
ances (Blyth, 2013). Eurozone surplus countries rejected mutual adjustment via the 
introduction of reflation policies given the importance of export-oriented sectors in the 
economy (Hall, 2014; Hancké, 2013). The result was the nationalization of economic 
policies with internal devaluation as the main form of adjustment (Erne, 2015). 
Governments implemented measures aimed at improving international (price) competi-
tiveness by reducing labour costs.
As insightfully illustrated by Galazka and Prosser (2020), however, the central posi-
tion of internal devaluation in the management of the Eurozone crisis did not reflect a 
trade union strategy of wage moderation and related policies aimed at undercutting 
Eurozone partners in a beggar-thy-neighbour manner. Rather the prominence of internal 
devaluation illustrates the vulnerability of Eurozone countries to the demands of external 
actors given blocked alternatives. For European officials, the use of internal devaluation 
reflected an interpretation that the crisis was not only about public finance but also about 
competitiveness (Bini Smaghi, 2013: 44–48). Liberalizing reforms in industrial relations 
and the implementation of austerity measures (public sector wage cuts/freezes), the con-
ditionality terms for securing financial assistance, were justified as part of an economic 
strategy designed to increase wage and price flexibility that were deemed essential for 
restoring international competitiveness (Schulten and Mueller, 2013).
Although a detailed analysis of the conditionality measures is outside the scope of this 
article, these externally imposed requirements have been extensively documented else-
where. Coverage of conditionality terms have been presented in both mapping exercises 
(Clauwaert and Schoemann, 2012; ETUI, 2013; Eurofound, 2013; Goyer and Valdivielso 
del Real, 2018; Moreira et al., 2015; Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015) and in standard aca-
demic analyses (Currie and Teague, 2017; Glatzer, 2018; Goyer et al., 2015; Hickland 
and Dundon, 2016; Marginson, 2015; Mueller, 2015; Schulten and Mueller, 2013). From 
the perspective of industrial relations, labour market reforms imposed by the Troika were 
primarily felt in the three areas of collective bargaining: pay cuts/freezes in the public 
sector, lowering of the minimum wage and devolution of the locus of collective bargain-
ing (Schulten and Mueller, 2013). The externally imposed reforms for the Greek and 
Portuguese bailouts also involved structural reforms in three areas of employment pro-
tection legislation: shortened notice periods for dismissals, facilitation of fixed-term con-
tracts and cuts to severance payments (Currie and Teague, 2017). The Troika did not seek 
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to impose the liberalization of collective redundancy schemes in Ireland since the regula-
tion of employment termination was already close to that of other liberal market econo-
mies. Some of the most important measures are summarized in the Supplemental 
Appendix.
The inclusion of structural reforms in the area of industrial relations as part of the 
conditionality requirements remains puzzling. The first issue is that the strategy of inter-
nal devaluation is contingent upon mutual adjustment from both balance of payment 
deficit and surplus countries (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). Internal devaluation is 
associated with two intended outcomes: restoring balance of payments equilibria by 
repressing internal demand for imports and engineering economic recovery via export-
led growth (Perez and Matsaganis, 2019: 260). Seeking to balance internal accounts via 
export-led growth is extremely difficult if adjustment is asymmetric in the form of only 
being imposed on debtor countries. Yet, the governance of the crisis has been character-
ized precisely by the asymmetric distribution of the costs of adjustment imposed on 
debtor countries (Marginson, 2015; Roos, 2019).
The second issue is that domestic aggregate demand and structural reforms constitute 
two key variables with differential impacts on macroeconomic outcomes, such as bal-
ance of payments equilibria, thereby requiring a disaggregation of their effects (Carlin 
and Soskice, 2009). The strategy of internal devaluation is partly predicated upon the 
implementation of austerity policies that, unsurprisingly, depress nominal growth 
(Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). Persistent weakness of domestic demand, in turn, 
reduces demand for imports and, thus, contributes to an improvement of the balance of 
payments. In contrast, the full effects of structural reforms, such as the liberalization of 
institutions of industrial relations, are contingent upon the overall context in which they 
are embedded (Thelen, 2009; see also Meardi, 2018). Structural reforms might exhibit 
their full effects, if at all, over the medium to long term (Hermann, 2017). The implica-
tion is that restoring balance of payments equilibria via a decrease in imports could take 
place in the presence of extensive austerity measures that contribute to persistent weak-
ness of domestic aggregate demand (Carlin and Soskice, 2009). Under this scenario, 
therefore, the implementation of structural reforms in the sphere of industrial reforms is 
not needed for reducing imbalances in the balance of payments.
Greece and Portugal, as well as Italy and Spain, illustrate how an adjustment pro-
cess based on severe demand contraction led to improvements in the balance of trade 
primarily through sharp falls in imports rather than the hoped-for boom in exports 
(Perez and Matsaganis, 2019). Austerity programmes designed to reduce the govern-
ment deficit by 11 percent in Greece and by 6 percent in Portugal in a short period of 
3 years, and by 9 percent in Ireland in 5 years, led to steep increases in unemployment. 
In each of these cases, unemployment more than doubled from pre-crisis levels, reach-
ing 27.5 percent, 16.4 percent and 15.5 percent in Greece, Portugal and Ireland during 
the peak of their crises. The contraction in economic activity led to a deep fall in 
imports.1 Average annual imports (2009-2017) fell by 38.1 percent in Greece relative 
to 2008 and by 19 percent in Portugal. Yet, lower unit labour costs did not result in 
substantial increases in exports: relative to 2008, average annual exports from 2009 to 
2017 dropped by 22.9 percent in Greece and in Portugal increased by a paltry 1.1 per-
cent. Corrections in the balance of payments were therefore achieved principally 
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through falls in imports rather than a surge in exports. The same pattern holds in Italy 
and Spain, where average annual imports fell by 17.1 percent and 20.5 percent while 
exports decreased by 10.1 percent and increased by 0.2 percent, respectively, over the 
same period relative to 2008. Ireland, where imports increased by 14.6 percent and 
exports increased by 24.5 percent, is the sole exception to this pattern.
Competing theoretical perspectives
This article contributes to the literature on industrial relations in the context of the 
Eurozone crisis via an analysis of the institutional construction of supranational organi-
zations of financial assistance, namely, the EFSF and its successor the ESM. The opera-
tions of these supranational organizations have been crucial in the imposition of internal 
devaluation policies as a condition for securing financial assistance. Several investiga-
tions of the Eurozone crisis have drawn from the insights of interest-based explanations 
(see, for example, Frieden and Walter, 2017; Hall, 2014). At their core, interest-based 
explanations emphasize that the sustainability of policy is contingent upon its fit with the 
interests of powerful actors. Different actors seek to advance their preferences via the 
implementation of institutional reforms that will result in favourable policies. Two broad 
categories of actors have been particularly important in the governance of the Eurozone 
crisis: the Troika (ECB, IMF and EU Commission) and national governments whose 
domestic banks were exposed to the rest of the Eurozone, that is, the so-called ‘creditor 
countries’ (Currie and Teague, 2017; Roos, 2019; Woodruff, 2016).
The preferences of the different members of the Troika have been influential in the 
management of the Eurozone crisis. From the perspective of the preferences of the ECB, 
the combination of its mandate to combat inflation and the legal prohibition on the direct 
purchase of government bonds of Eurozone governments on primary markets meant an 
important reduction in the strategies of adjustment to the crisis (Armingeon and Baccaro, 
2012: 271; Hall, 2014: 1232). Its preferences militated against a traditional lender of last 
resort role similar to the one exercised by the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of 
England. Yet, the policy position of the ECB for the management of the crisis was also 
characterized by the introduction of structural reforms in the form of liberalization of 
industrial relations regulation – as well as the implementation of austerity measures 
(ECB, 2015; Hermann, 2017: 52–58). The reasoning of the ECB was that the introduc-
tion of structural reforms designed to reduce rigidities in the process of adjustment would 
help to generate economic growth that, in turn, would reduce government deficits (Bini 
Smaghi, 2013: 44–48; ECB, 2004: 52, 2009: 71). As such, therefore, the main targets of 
the ECB in the field of industrial relations were institutional arrangements that provide 
strong employment protection and those that support coordinated wage bargaining (ECB, 
2009: 71, 2012: 58–62, 2015). Employment protection legislation that makes it difficult 
for companies to dismiss employees reduces labour mobility and leads to a market dual-
ism between insiders and outsiders whereby the burdens of adjustment are imposed on 
vulnerable groups (ECB, 2009: 71). Institutional arrangements that limit wage flexibil-
ity, on the other hand, hinder the transmission of monetary policy as changes in interest 
rates do not translate symmetrically (downwards or upwards) in wage adjustments and 
rates of employment (ECB, 2015). This issue is particularly important in the context of a 
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currency union since differences in unit labour costs could easily translate into problems 
of competitiveness and of balance of payments imbalances (ECB, 2012: 58–59; Hancké, 
2013). Identified policy recommendations that would strengthen wage flexibility are the 
following: lowering minimum wages, lessening the automatic character of wage indexa-
tion schemes and facilitating wage bargaining at the firm level (ECB, 2012: 61, 2015).
The preferences of the IMF also favoured the combination of austerity policies and of 
liberalization of industrial relations (Blanchard et al., 2013). The IMF had developed a 
(deserved) reputation for stringent conditionality in its programmes (Henning, 2017). 
The implementation of austerity policies by recipient countries had been a predominant, 
and constant, feature of IMF conditionality with the aim to restore balance of payments 
imbalances via, among other policies, the reduction of imports. In its policy recommen-
dations in the context of the Eurozone crisis, IMF officials advocated the reduction in 
public sector wages in order to improve the fiscal position of national governments seek-
ing financial assistance (Blanchard et al., 2013: 17; Clift, 2018: 146-147). Moreover, 
IMF conditionality increasingly requires the liberalization of labour markets of recipient 
countries. In its specific analysis of the Eurozone crisis, the policy recommendations of 
the IMF highlighted the importance of labour market institutions for micro flexibility 
and macro adjustment. Strong employment protection for open-ended contracts hinders 
the reallocation of workers to jobs needed to sustain growth and, thus, negatively affects 
productivity growth. IMF officials recommended increasing the prominence of unem-
ployment insurance and deregulating regulation of dismissals of employees on open-
ended contracts, thereby espousing the core features of the flexicurity model (Blanchard 
et al., 2013: 5–10). In the area of collective bargaining, the IMF advocated for the greater 
use of opt-out clauses to facilitate the decentralization of collective bargaining towards 
the level of the firm to allow countries to better adjust to macroeconomic shocks 
(Blanchard et al., 2013: 17).
The EU Commission, the third member of the Troika, also supported policies that 
allocated the burdens of adjustment on debtor countries (Hyman, 2015; Mailand, 2020; 
Marginson, 2015). The role of the European Union in the liberalization of labour markets 
was substantially strengthened with the implementation of a new economic governance 
regime designed to update the Stability and Growth pact in the new context of the eco-
nomic crisis (Marginson, 2015; Schmidt, 2016). Labour market policies of EU member 
states have become subject to multilateral surveillance procedures as a result of several 
legislative changes: the European Semester (2010), the Six Pack (2011), the Two Pack, 
and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (2013) (Erne, 2015; Jordan et 
al., 2021). In particular, the influence of the EU Commission over the labour market poli-
cies of European countries has increased via the issue of yearly country-specific recom-
mendations (CSRs) aimed at countries exhibiting ‘excessive deficits’ and other forms of 
macroeconomic imbalances. In addition to the potential issue of substantial financial 
sanctions, the prescriptions of the EU Commission for adjustment lie in core areas of 
industrial relations: wage levels, employment protection legislation and level of collec-
tive bargaining.
Interest-based explanations provide important insights for understanding the govern-
ance of the Eurozone crisis. The imposition of austerity policies and the liberalization of 
industrial relations have been prominent as conditionality features imposed on debtor 
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countries in alignment with the preferences of the members of the Troika (see, for exam-
ple, Roos, 2019). The assertion that supranational actors exercised influence over the 
process of institutional creation is not revolutionary. Yet, the preferences of powerful 
supranational actors constitute a too broad concept for understanding the formation of 
new institutional arrangements. Drawing from the actor-centred perspective, we high-
light that the interests of (powerful) actors are not monolithic, thereby enabling them to 
prioritize in a selective manner specific dimensions of their preferences at the expense of 
others (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 2010; Scharpf, 1997: 60–68). The puzzle, then, is to 
specify how, and which, preferences of powerful actors are translated into institutional 
outcomes.
The cases of the ECB and the IMF, two key supranational organizations involved in 
the design and operations of new institutions of financial assistance, illustrate the impor-
tance of the presence of non-monolithic preferences. For the ECB, the constant focus on 
inflation targeting has been accompanied by different priorities regarding the causal 
mechanisms to fulfil this objective (Schmidt, 2016). Under Trichet, the focus was on 
‘credibility’ in order to maintain the independence of the ECB vis-à-vis Eurozone mem-
ber states (Bastasin, 2015: 236–254). A politically responsive ECB would be highly con-
ducive to the provision of ‘easy’ credit. Under Draghi, in contrast, inflation fighting was 
framed under the mantra of stability (Schmidt, 2016: 1039–1042). The collapse of the 
European financial/monetary system would negatively influence the ability of policy-
makers to contain inflation. The focus on different causal mechanisms for inflation tar-
geting is highly relevant. Framing inflation targeting under the mantra of ‘stability’ 
enabled the ECB, under Draghi, to fully develop its bond-buying programme on second-
ary markets while recipient countries continued to implement austerity and liberalization 
of industrial relations (Meardi, 2014; Woodruff, 2016). Inflation targeting as a preference 
is not monolithic, thereby enabling the ECB to focus on different objectives that resulted 
in specific coalitions with other actors based on overlapping interests.
The preferences of the IMF, on the other hand, are varied and complex and have 
exhibited strong, but partial, overlap with those of other actors, most notably the ECB 
and the German government (Clift, 2018; Henning, 2017). As previously discussed, the 
IMF is a strong advocate of stringent conditionality in its lending decisions in the form 
of austerity policies and liberalization of industrial relations regulation (Blanchard et al., 
2013). Yet, the policy positions of the IMF extend beyond stringent conditionality. The 
lending decisions of the IMF are also guided by the core criterion of sustainable debt 
(Clift, 2018: 135–137; Henning, 2017: 49–55, 129). In the case of the first Greek finan-
cial assistance package, the IMF (unsuccessfully) advocated the restructuring of existing 
debt with the imposition of losses on private investors before the provision of additional 
loans since financial support might not be effective if debt that is unlikely to be reim-
bursed piles up (see below).
A second strand of interest-based explanations focuses on the preferences of large 
Eurozone governments whose domestic banks were seriously exposed to the rest of the 
Eurozone (Goyer and Valdivielso del Real, 2014; Roos, 2019). Framed under the concept 
of financialization, this strand highlights the importance of structural developments in 
the global economy that have increased the prominence of capital, most notably via the 
liberalization of capital flows across borders, at the expense of labour (Culpepper, 2015; 
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Prosser, 2014). The removal of controls on capital flows enabled banks to proceed to an 
international diversification of their assets that, in turn, led to a substantial increase in the 
degree of concentration of finance (Roos, 2019). In the context of the Eurozone, this 
concentration process meant that the outstanding obligations of several Eurozone gov-
ernments (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and of their domestic financial 
institutions, were held by a relatively small number of banks principally headquartered 
in France and Germany at the beginning of the crisis. For instance, slightly under 60 
percent of all outstanding Greek debt (state and national banks) was held by French and 
German banks in early 2010 (Bank for International Settlements, 2010: 17). Moreover, 
these relatively few influential (French/German) financial institutions were also consid-
ered systemically important, that is, ‘too big to fail’ (Thompson, 2015). These systemic 
banks experienced substantial external growth as the result of their takeover acquisitions 
and securitization activities (Goyer and Valdivielso del Real, 2014).
Building on these developments, an important sub-strand of financialization primarily 
conceptualizes the governance of the Eurozone crisis as a distributive conflict among 
member states over the allocation of the costs of adjustment for the management of the 
accumulated debt that was unlikely to be serviced as originally planned (Frieden and 
Walter, 2017). The preferences of Eurozone member states reflect their international 
investment position as either net recipients or net exporters of international capital flows. 
From the perspective of debtor countries, whose national governments accumulated sub-
stantial liabilities, their preferences lie in debt restructuring/debt relief given their inabil-
ity to repay at contracted conditions and their continuing dependence on accessing 
short-term capital markets. In contrast, governments of countries whose domestic banks 
provided funding to the rest of the Eurozone preferred adjustment to occur in debtor 
countries targeted by private bondholders via the implementation of measures of internal 
devaluation (Roos, 2019: 225–234). Although constituting a classic case of a debt crisis 
regarding the distribution of the costs of adjustment, the Eurozone is different in one 
respect from previous episodes, namely, that the strategy of external devaluation (cur-
rency devaluation and increases in monetary supply) is not available. In the event of debt 
default in Eurozone countries targeted by private bondholders, Northern European gov-
ernments, especially France and Germany, would face the politically unpopular prospect 
of engineering financial rescue packages of their own domestic, and systemic, banks that 
previously provided funding to the rest of the Eurozone (Thompson, 2015). Furthermore, 
these rescue operations would have to take place in the context of the absence of a lender 
of last resort under the control of national governments.
Financialization explanations correctly highlight the heightened intensity of (power-
ful) countries in seeking to protect domestic banks from their exposure to the rest of the 
Eurozone in the context of the institutional apparatus of the Maastricht Treaty. The asser-
tion that actors seek to influence the design of new international institutions is uncontro-
versial (Keohane, 1984; see Goyer and Valdivielso del Real, 2018, for an overview). In 
the context of the Eurozone crisis, something as important as the distribution of the costs 
of adjustment to the crisis is certainly worth fighting about as national governments 
(creditor and debtor alike) operated under a range of reduced adjustment strategies (De 
Grauwe, 2013). Yet, financialization explanations exclusively emphasizing the role of 
(French/German) policy-makers seeking to protect domestic banks remain incomplete. 
10 European Journal of Industrial Relations 00(0)
Preferences of powerful governments derived from their international asset position do 
not capture the presence of important variations in positioning for institutional innova-
tion as well as the importance of coalition building. France and Germany shared the 
common goal of the preservation of the single currency, and the protection of their 
domestic banks from their exposure to the rest of the Eurozone, but sharply disagreed on 
many aspects of the process of institutional reform and on the distribution of the costs of 
adjustment (Schimmelfennig, 2015). The major issues of disagreement were the follow-
ing: participation of the IMF in the decision-making process of financial assistance, vot-
ing rules regarding the provision of funding and the allocation of a banking licence to the 
new supranational organizations of financial assistance (EFSF/ESM) in order to enable 
them to borrow from the ECB (see below). More specifically, the French proposals for 
institutional building sought to tackle the financial crisis via the provision of massive 
liquidity, not via the implementation of internal devaluation policies. Yet, reforms in 
industrial relations were prominent as features of conditionality despite the opposition of 
the French government. Our analysis, therefore, illustrates that institutional outputs do 
not constitute a lowest common denominator solution among powerful actors. The case 
of the formation of the EFSF/ESM highlights that the structural features of these two 
Eurozone institutions reflected the preferences of some, but not all, important actors. The 
question, then, is to specify how, and which, preferences are translated into outcomes.
Theoretical framework
Our argument is inspired by insights from the actor-centred institutionalism perspective 
to account for the specific features of governance reforms of the Eurozone financial 
assistance regime (EFSF/ESM). In the perspective of actor-centred institutionalism, gov-
ernance outputs result from strategic interaction among intentional actors, but these 
occur in a specific environment whereby these interactions are themselves structured and 
shaped, but not determined, by the characteristics of the institutional settings in which 
they take place (Scharpf, 1997, 2000). Actor-centred institutionalism constitutes a frame-
work that captures the interdependent character of the relationship between actors and 
institutions across different domains in social sciences, including industrial relations 
(Scharpf, 1997: 37; see also Bechter et al., 2021). Institutional arrangements operate as a 
constraint on the strategic behaviour of actors, yet institutions are also the creation of 
specific constellations of interacting actors (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 2010; Scharpf, 
2000: 775–782). How do actors and institutions relate to one another? Two theoretical 
features are prominent in actor-centred institutionalism. These are institutional arrange-
ments as configurations of power and the importance of coalitions of actors based on 
overlapping interests in institutional building.
The first theoretical feature of the actor-centred institutionalism perspective high-
lights the relational character of institutions that structure interactions among partici-
pants (Scharpf, 1997: 36–50). Building from classical institutional approaches, the 
actor-centred institutionalism perspective incorporates the prominence of institutional 
arrangements as a highly influential variable shaping the relative power of actors in an 
asymmetrical manner by privileging the interests of some against those of other partici-
pants. Institutions do so by granting, or limiting, legal rights of participation over key 
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aspects of the decision-making process. The institutional framework in which important 
decisions take place mediates the translation of actor preferences into desired outcomes 
(Hall, 1986).
Explanations based on the prominence of institutions, conceptualized as power con-
figurations, are particularly suited for understanding the management of the Eurozone 
crisis given the asymmetric distribution of the costs of adjustment. The ability of actors 
to resist the imposition of internal devaluation policies in the area of industrial relations 
was constrained by the institutional features of the newly created supranational organiza-
tions. Two broad categories of actors have been particularly important in the governance 
of the Eurozone crisis: the Troika (ECB, IMF and EU Commission) and national govern-
ments whose domestic banks were exposed to the rest of the Eurozone (Currie and 
Teague, 2017; Roos, 2019; Woodruff, 2016). These actors were involved in the different 
institutional decision-making stages of the process of providing financial assistance.
The formal process of providing financial assistance via newly created supranational 
organizations (EFSF/ESM) is characterized by three stages (Henning, 2017: 37–55, 
101-130). The first involves the members of the Troika drawing an assessment of the 
sustainability of the national public debt and of the potential financial need of countries 
targeted by private bondholders. In the second stage, the members of the Troika engage 
in internal negotiations on the acceptability of the application for financial assistance 
and, if deemed essential, on its associated elements of conditionality. Two separate 
reports are produced: one by the IMF and one by the European Commission. The con-
tents of these two reports have been similar as the members of the Troika coordinate 
their activities. Supranational actors with strong preferences for the adoption of internal 
devaluation policies therefore exercise prominent influence over the first two stages of 
the decision-making process for awarding financial assistance.
In the third stage, the negotiation process shifts outward to Eurozone countries that 
are members of the EFSF/ESM. Eurozone governments, via their finance ministers, 
negotiate on the terms of conditions and amounts of funding presented in the reports 
provided by the Troika. If approved, or agreed after amendments, the Troika will act as 
monitor of the implementation of the assistance programme. Moreover, the voting rules 
on the provision of financial assistance at the third stage provide a preponderant influ-
ence to large creditor countries (Henning, 2017: 239–246; Mueller, 2015). Under the 
EFSF, unanimity in voting procedures was required for the approval of financial assis-
tance, thereby providing substantial influence, as well as veto power, to large countries 
with domestic banks exposed to the rest of the Eurozone. Under the ESM, on the other 
hand, the continuation of unanimity in the process of approval was coupled with the 
introduction of a new emergency voting procedure stipulating that a qualified majority 
of 85 percent of voting shares from ESM countries is sufficient for the provision of finan-
cial assistance. The use of the emergency voting procedure is conditional upon a shared 
assessment by the ECB and the EU Commission that failure to assist threatened Eurozone 
countries would lead to systemic risks to the entire Eurozone edifice. From the perspec-
tive of Germany and France, for instance, their respective 27 and 20 percent voting rights 
in the ESM translates into effective veto power over lending decisions while the use of 
qualified majority voting lessened the risks of paralysis by removing the veto power of 
smaller states (Bastasin, 2015: 464–468).
12 European Journal of Industrial Relations 00(0)
Moreover, the veto power of the French and German governments over lending deci-
sions has been used to resist calls from the IMF to combine internal devaluation with 
debt relief for Greece (first bailout) and Ireland (Henning, 2017: 84–91, 119–120). 
Although a strong proponent of conditionality, the IMF also expressed serious doubts 
that reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio in Greece could occur without substantial debt 
write-downs. In the case of Ireland, on the other hand, the IMF advocated debt relief 
based on an interpretation that sovereign debt issues were the outcome of a banking cri-
sis. In both cases, however, the governments of France and Germany used their veto 
power to oppose debt restructuring since it would have resulted in a banking crisis at 
home. The ECB also supported the actions of these two important creditor countries by 
highlighting that debt restructuring that result in losses for private bondholders is desta-
bilizing in the midst of a financial crisis. Institutionally based vetoes, once in place, 
constrain the ability of actors who seek to overcome them.
The institutional features of the supranational organizations of financial assistance 
have reduced the ability of Eurozone countries to resist the imposition of internal devalu-
ation policies as conditionality criteria for securing financial assistance. The composition 
of the Troika enables the participation of supranational actors with marked preferences 
for structural reforms in the area of industrial relations. The approval process of financial 
assistance also provides veto power over lending decisions to large member states with 
domestic banks exposed to the rest of the Eurozone. Yet, institutional perspectives con-
ceptualized as configurations of power remain incomplete for our understanding of the 
governance of the Eurozone crisis despite their significant insights. An important issue is 
the process of institutional building. If institutional arrangements are so powerful, inten-
tional actors will seek to influence the design of their structural features in order to shape 
the distribution of resources (Roe, 1998). What accounts for the origins and structural 
features of new institutions? This question is legitimate because new institutional 
arrangements of financial assistance needed to be set up in the institutional context of the 
Maastricht Treaty, that is, an institutional framework designed around central bank inde-
pendence as a disciplining mechanism on countries perceived as being inflation prone, 
but not designed for the provision of financial assistance (De Grauwe, 2013).
The second theoretical feature of the actor-centred institutionalism perspective high-
lights the relational character of how actors interact with each other (Scharpf, 1997: 
36–58; see also Hall, 1984). The perspective emphasizes the importance of coalitions 
among some, but not all, interacting actors based on the overlapping interests of their 
non-monolithic preferences in the process of institutional innovation (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Scharpf, 1997: 55–58). The presence of non-monolithic interests enables 
actors to prioritize in a selective manner specific dimensions of their preferences at the 
expense of others (Scharpf, 1997: 60–68). Although actors are undoubtedly driven by 
overarching goals, such as preventing the implosion of the Eurozone and protecting 
domestic banks from their exposure to other countries, they often prioritize specific 
dimensions of their preferences at the expense of others. As a result, the implementation 
of the preferences of actors will rarely prescribe only one strategy of adjustment. In turn, 
selecting specific preferences enlarges the range of coalitional possibilities (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Institutional innovation results from the ability of actors to engage in 
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coalition making by stressing different objectives across issue areas based on overlap-
ping interests with (some) other participants.
The institutional construction of the new Eurozone regime 
of financial assistance: an empirical overview
Drawing from the insights from actor-centred institutionalism, our analysis surveys two 
important developments in the new Eurozone regime of financial assistance: the compo-
sition of the Troika and the voting rules of the EFSF/ESM. These institutional reforms 
sought to overcome the issues associated with the absence of a crisis management capac-
ity (De Grauwe, 2013). The first major issue of institutional building concerned the com-
position of the Troika (crucial to the first and second stage of the decision-making 
process on financial assistance). The inclusion of the IMF as a Troika member was not 
pre-ordained. In the run-up to the formation of the EFSF, EU officials and many Eurozone 
countries focused solely on the IMF’s expertise in monitoring the implementation of 
financial assistance programmes (Henning, 2017: 76–81). The most important source of 
opposition came from the French government whose resistance was driven by the strin-
gent conditionality reputation of the IMF (Bastasin, 2015: 146–197). The Sarkozy gov-
ernment, supported by Southern European countries, instead emphasized the importance 
of a massive financial firewall funded by the direct intervention of the ECB on bond 
markets that would deter speculative attacks (Bastasin, 2015: 151–155, 193–210). The 
French government also proposed the granting of a banking licence to new supranational 
organizations of financial assistance to enable them to borrow directly from the ECB 
(Woodruff, 2016: 98–103). Newly created supranational organizations would be endowed 
with massive financial resources. In other words, the French proposals sought to tackle 
the financial crisis via the provision of massive liquidity rather than the implementation 
of internal devaluation policies.
However, the French proposals were rejected by a coalition consisting of the German 
government, the ECB and smaller Eurozone creditor countries recording balance of pay-
ments surpluses (Austria, Finland and the Netherlands). From the perspective of the 
German government, the involvement of the IMF as a Troika member was essential 
given its developed reputation for stringent conditionality (Bastasin, 2015: 133–169; 
Henning, 2017). The credibility of the IMF was crucial for the Merkel government in 
overcoming substantial domestic constraints – the most important being the Federal 
Constitutional Court based in Karlsruhe. The main task of the highly respected court is 
to protect the German Constitution (Basic Law of 1949) via its extensive power of judi-
cial review. Throughout the course of the crisis, the German government was deeply 
concerned that the provision of financial assistance to fellow Eurozone member states, 
especially although not exclusively through the ECB, could be successfully challenged 
as a violation of the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht treaty (Woodruff, 2016: 98–103). 
As a result, the Merkel administration refused to commit to the creation of a new supra-
national organization of financial assistance lacking stringent conditionality criteria. In 
January 2010, the German government, supported most prominently by its Dutch coun-
terpart, strongly rejected the French government’s proposals for the rapid provision of 
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funding designed to build a massive financial firewall in the absence of strong condition-
ality (Bastasin, 2015: 151–159, 192–211). Instead, the German government successfully 
insisted on the acceptance of two conditions for its participation: the adoption of the 
principle of conditionality and the involvement of the IMF as a member of the Troika 
with responsibilities in the negotiation of the terms of conditionality (Bastasin, 2015: 
146–180; Henning, 2017: 93–97).
The second major issue of institutional building concerned the voting rules among 
Eurozone governments (third stage of the decision-making process on financial assis-
tance). In the case of the EFSF, the French government strenuously pushed for a deci-
sion-making process based on straightforward majority voting (one country–one vote) to 
swiftly repel speculative attacks from private bondholders (Bastasin, 2015: 197–200). 
This proposal received the enthusiastic support of Southern European countries. The 
French position reflected a specific understanding of the Eurozone crisis, namely, the 
importance of preventing financial contagion in the absence of a crisis management 
apparatus (Tooze, 2018: 109–115). As such, the French proposals did not require the 
implementation of internal devaluation strategies. As part of its contingent acceptance of 
the EFSF, however, the Merkel administration refused to commit to the creation of new 
supranational organizations unless provided with veto power over the disbursement of 
funds. Supported by the same group of smaller Eurozone countries (Austria, Finland and 
the Netherlands), the German government threatened to abstain from financially contrib-
uting to new financial assistance mechanisms in order to overcome the preferences of 
France and Southern European countries (Henning, 2017: 239–246; see also Schild, 
2020). In the case of the ESM, the German government, under pressure from the 
Constitutional Court, made its participation contingent on the involvement of the 
Bundestag (Henning, 2017: 171–174). That is, the approval of the German parliament is 
required for both the provision of a mandate to the Troika for negotiations on financial 
assistance (first and second stages) as well as for the terms of conditions associated with 
requests for support (third stage).
The actions of the German government in the set-up of institutional mechanisms of 
financial assistance have been presented as an instance of coercive, but reluctant, hegem-
ony (Beck, 2013; Currie and Teague, 2017). Seeking to prevent the collapse of the 
Eurozone, but operating under domestic pressures to avoid committing German taxpay-
ers to fiscal transfers to debtor countries, the Merkel government acted in a manner that 
prevented the implementation of a Keynesian response to the crisis as internal devalua-
tion policies were demanded in exchange for financial assistance. Our actor-centred 
institutional analysis, however, builds upon these approaches as we highlight the impor-
tance of coalitional politics as the intervention of the ECB proved crucial to the design of 
the specific structural contours of the EFSF/ESM, thereby complementing the activism 
of the German government. The role of the ECB as a provider of funds, from an initially 
narrow focus on inflation targeting to arguably having become a lender of last resort, has 
been well documented (Schmidt, 2016; Woodruff, 2016). In order to provide liquidity to 
the financial system to prevent its collapse, the ECB started its Securities Market Program 
(SMP) in May 2010 organized around the purchase of distressed bonds for a limited 
number of countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) on secondary markets 
(Roos, 2019: 235–250). Furthermore, under Draghi, the ECB in the summer of 2012 
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launched its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme whereby it could pur-
chase bonds of targeted Eurozone countries in unlimited quantity.
Our analysis, on the contrary, highlights the coalitional role of the ECB in the design 
of new Eurozone supranational institutions and in the elaboration of the terms of condi-
tionality. First, the ECB rejected the French proposals to provide new supranational insti-
tutions with a banking licence that would have enabled them to access the (unlimited) 
financing capacities of the Frankfurt-based financial institution (Bastasin, 2015: 181–
204, 340–387). The French proposals for the provision of massive liquidity were contin-
gent upon their acceptance by the ECB. The refusal of the ECB to accept the concept of 
the EFSF/ESM as a credit institution, in turn, strengthened the bargaining position of the 
German government opposed to the provision of financial assistance without condition-
ality. The institutional consequence of this stance was the agreement between France and 
Germany on the use of unanimity for the initial size and increases of the financial contri-
butions of each member state to the EFSF/ESM out of fears that, otherwise, financial 
commitments would be ever expanding. The funding capacities of the EFSF/ESM were 
thus limited, thereby highlighting the dependency of actors on the involvement of the 
ECB. Second, the ECB successfully linked its contingent use of secondary bond markets 
(SMP) to the formation of Eurozone institutions of financial assistance based on strin-
gent conditionality (Woodruff, 2016). Important purchases of bonds on secondary mar-
kets, which were held mainly by French and German banks, took place after the formation 
of the EFSF/ESM and their associated internal devaluation character.
The intervention of the ECB was crucial to the survival of the Eurozone. Under the 
SMP, French and German banks were able to reduce their exposure to the rest of the 
Eurozone by selling their bond holdings to the ECB (Roos, 2019: 225–273). Illustrating 
the importance of selective coalitional politics, the preferences of the ECB overlapped 
with those of France and Germany, the two biggest Eurozone countries, on the protection 
of large systemic banks from their exposure to the rest of the Eurozone (Bastasin, 2015: 
170–180). The ECB was concerned about both the effects of the cancellation of debt on 
the balance sheets of Eurozone banks and the likely subsequent reluctance of private 
bondholders to purchase sovereign debt after experiencing losses (Henning, 2017: 115–
118). Yet, the ECB departed from the French proposals for institutional reforms as they 
would reduce its independence by subordinating it to the demands of Eurozone govern-
ments (Bastasin, 2015: 170–204, 236–254). By contrast, the preferences of the ECB and 
of the German government in preventing financial collapse overlapped around the imple-
mentation of internal devaluation.
Conclusion
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of the financial crisis on national 
systems of industrial relations via an analysis of important Eurozone governance reforms, 
namely, the new supranational organizations of financial assistance. Drawing from actor-
centred institutionalism, we illustrate the prominence of the interdependent relationship 
between institutions and actors by highlighting the importance of coalitions among 
actors based on the overlapping of their non-monolithic preferences. There was nothing 
automatic about the imposition of internal devaluation policies in the management of the 
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crisis. Our analysis highlights the contingency in political and social life. The institu-
tional features of the EFSF/ESM acted as a serious constraint on the strategic behaviour 
of Eurozone countries seeking to resist the (external) imposition of internal devaluation 
policies as a condition for securing financial assistance. Yet, these new institutional 
arrangements of Eurozone governance emerged as a contested outcome secured by a 
coalition of activist actors based on overlapping preferences for the implementation of 
internal devaluation policies. As illustrated by our analysis of the roles played by the 
ECB and the German government in the construction of these institutions, the non-mon-
olithic preferences of these actors increase their ability to engage in coalition making.
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